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CENTRAL ISSUE 
The central issue before this court is whether giving notice 
pursuant to Section 38-1-7(3) is an element of plaintiff's prima 
facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18, or an 
"avoidance or affirmative defense" that must be raised by 
defendant. 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Paragraphs 2 and 3 under defendant's "Statement of 
Facts" are inappropriate since plaintiff's first set of 
interrogatories and request for production of documents were not 
part of the trial record below. (See Addendum to Brief of 
Appellee, Michael Kampros, pp 2-7.) There was also no record 
below as to what documents were or were not produced pursuant 
thereto. Id. 
2. Paragraph 17 under defendant's "Statement of Facts" is 
accurate. However, it should be noted that the Amended Judgment 
was paid and a Satisfaction of Judgment filed on stipulation of 
counsel that plaintiff's right to pursue this appeal would not be 
limited thereby. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 
38-1-18 DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF MAILING 
UNDER SECTION 38-1-7(3). 
As developed in pages 7-12 of Appellant's Brief, a prima 
facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 does not 
require proof of mailing under Section 38-1-7(3). A claim that 
1 
Section 38-1-7(3) was not complied wLth is an "avoidance or 
affirmative defense" that must be raLsed by defendant. 
In response thereto, defendant alleges that 1) caselaw from 
other jurisdictions indicates otherwise, 2) the Utah cases of AAA 
Fencing Co. vs. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 
1986) and Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 
(Utah App. 1990) indicate otherwise, and 3) the general rules for 
determining the elements of a prima facie case for statutory 
claims are different than for common law claims. In fact, none 
of these are true. 
A. The Caselaw Cited By Defendant From Other Jurisdictions 
Is Inapposite. 
Defendant cites cases interpreting notice requirements under 
mechanic's lien laws in Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Kansas and 
Arizona. None of those cases are applicable here. In the 
Colorado case, the court held that language specific to the 
Colorado mechanic's lien statute (not found in the Utah statute) 
required proof of mailing to establish a valid mechanic's lien in 
Colorado. In the other cases, unlike this case, the issue of 
notice was litigated at trial. 
In Daniel vs. M.J. Development, Inc., 603 P.2d 947 (Colo. 
App. 1979), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that, under the 
Colorado mechanic's lien statute, proof of notice was required to 
establish a valid mechanic's lien. The Court based it's holding 
on the language of Section 38-22-109(3) Colorado Revised 
2 
Statutes, which provides: 
In order to preserve any lien for work 
performed or materials furnished, there must 
be a notice of intent to file a lien 
statement served upon the owner or reputed 
owner of the property or his agent...at least 
ten days before the time of filing the lien 
statement with the county clerk and recorder. 
Id. at 948-49 (citing Section 38-22-109(3) Colorado Revised 
Statutes). 
The court also based its holding on legislative history that 
demonstrated a "clear legislative intent to require the statutory 
notice in order to perfect a valid lien." _Id. at 949. The 
Colorado Court of Appeals held that "lien claimants must prove 
compliance with the statute upon remand in order to establish a 
valid lien." _Id. at 949. 
In this case, there is no such language in the Utah Statute. 
Judge Hilder found that plaintiff had a valid mechanic's lien, 
even though there was no proof of mailing. Defendant did not 
appeal that ruling. Furthermore, Section 38-1-7(3) is worded in 
the negative, unlike the Colorado statute: 
Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the 
reputed owner or record owner precludes the lien 
claimant from an award of costs and attorneys1 fees 
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action 
to enforce the lien. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-7(3). 
As discussed in Appellant's Brief, a defense under Section 38-1-
7(3) must be raised by the defendant at trial or it is waived, 
just as any other statutory defense such as the statute of 
3 
frauds, statute of limitations or governmental immunity. 
In all of the remaining cases cited by defendant from other 
jurisdictions the issue of notice was raised at trial and 
adjudicated on the merits. In Morse Bros. Contractors Inc. v. 
C.J.H. Construction Co., 675 P.2d 1122 (Or. App. 1984), the issue 
of notice under the Oregon mechanic's lien statute was raised at 
trial and both the trial court and appellate court held that the 
notice requirement had been complied with.1 
In Northlake Concrete Products, Inc. vs. Wylie, 663 P.2d 
1380, 1381 (Wash. App. 1983), the defendant raised failure to 
give notice pursuant to the Washington mechanic's lien statute in 
defendant quotes the following language from that case out 
of context: "To entitle a lien claimant to costs and attorney's 
fees, compliance with the notice requirements must be pleaded and 
approved." (Brief of Appellee Michael Kampros, page 18.) This 
is simply a paraphrase of Oregon Revised Statutes 87.057(3), 
which states that "A plaintiff or cross-complainant seeking to 
foreclose a lien in a suit to foreclose shall plead and prove 
compliance with [the notice requirements]." .Id. at 1123. 
Defendant also misleads the court by only quoting part of 
Oregon Revised Statute, Section 87.057(3). The entire section is 
as follows: 
A plaintiff or cross-complainant seeking to 
foreclose a lien in a suit to foreclose shall 
plead and prove compliance with [the notice 
requirements]. No costs, disbursements, or 
attorney's fees otherwise allowable as 
provided by ORS 87.060 shall be allowed to 
any party failing to comply with the 
provisions of this section. 
Or. Rev. Stet. 87.057 (3) . 
Corresponding language is not found in the Utah Mechanic's lien 
statute. 
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a motion for summary judgment. In Kopp's Rug Co., Inc. vs. 
Talbot, 620 P.2d 1167 (Kan. App. 1980), the defendant likewise 
raised the issue of compliance with the notice requirement under 
the Kansas mechanic's lien statute at trial. In that case, the 
court concluded that the "service of notice of the mechanic's 
lien sufficiently complied with" the applicable statute. ,Id. at 
1170. Similarly, in Williams v. A.J. Bayless Markets, Inc., 476 
P.2d 869 (Ariz. App. 1970), the issue of notice was raised at 
trial. _Id. at 871. The court ruled that, although notice was 
given, the notice was not given "within a reasonable time" after 
recording the claim of lien, as required by Arizona statute. Id. 
at 874. 
In this case, Mr. Kampros did not raise the notice issue 
until after the trial, arguing for the first time in his Motion 
for Reconsideration that it was part of plaintiff's "prima facie" 
case and that he had no duty to raise the issue at trial as an 
"avoidance or affirmative defense" to plaintiff's claim for 
attorney's fees. As set forth in plaintiff's Motion to Reopen 
for Limited Purpose, the notice requirement under Section 38-1-
7(3) was complied with but because defendant did not raise the 
defense at trial, the issue was not adjudicated on the merits. 
B. The Two Utah Cases Cited by Defendant Involve Lack of 
Jurisdiction. 
Next, defendants rely on the Utah cases of AAA Fencing 
Company vs. Raintree Development, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986) and 
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Govert Copier Painting vs. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 
1990). The issue in those cases was whether the 12-month 
"statute of limitations" under 38-1-11 was a "statute of 
limitations'' or "jurisdictional." In both cases, the Utah courts 
held it was jurisdictional. 
In AAA Fencing Company vs. Raintree Development, 714 P.2d 
289 (Utah 1986), the court stated: 
Properly framed, the issue before us is whether an untimely 
action under our mechanics1 lien statute affects the rights 
or merely the remedies of the parties. We disagree with 
plaintiffs that it affects merely their remedies and is 
therefore subject to waiver and estoppel as are procedural 
statutes of limitations and hold instead that it is 
jurisdictional and forecloses their rights... 
Id. at 290-91. (Emphasis added.) 
[F]ailure to enforce a mechanic's lien within the 
statutory period is a jurisdictional question.... 
Id. at 291. (Emphasis added.) 
[T]he Court is without jurisdiction to entertain such 
an action as this when the period of its availability 
has expired. 
Id. at 292. (Emphasis added.) 
Lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Rule 12(h)(2), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. 
Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986) ("[A] lack of jurisdiction 
can be raised at any time by either party or by the court.") 
In Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah 
App. 1990), the court cited AAA Fencing Company in also holding 
that the 12-month "statute of limitations" under Section 38-1-11 
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is jurisdictional: 
In AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy 
Co., 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: "The time for 
enforcing mechanic's liens set out in section 
38-1-11... limits a lienor's rights to twelve 
months after his work is completed. At that 
point, both his rights and his remedies under 
the statute are extinguished." 
Govert at 173. 
The notice requirement under section 38-1-7(3) is not 
jurisdictional. 
C. The General Rules For Determining "Prima Facie" 
Elements Are the Same for Both Statutory Claims and Tort Claims. 
Finally, defendant argues that the general rules for 
determining the prime facie elements of a claim are different for 
statutory claims than for tort claims. (Brief of Appellee 
Michael Kampros, page 20-22.) This is not true. For example, in 
Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 
1998), plaintiff brought a statutory claim for unlawful detainer 
pursuant to Section 78-36-1 et seq. Defendant failed to raise a 
statute of limitations defense under Section 78-12-29(2) or a 
defective summons defense under Section 78-36-8. The court held 
both were affirmative defenses that defendant had waived by 
failing to raise at trial; 
Under rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "[a] party waives all defenses and 
objections which he does not present either 
by motion...or, if he has made no motion, in 
his answer or reply." Utah R.Civ.P. 12(h). 
A party waives a statute of limitations 
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defense by failing to raise it in a 
responsive pleading or by motion before 
submitting a responsive filing. [Citation 
Omitted.] Likewise, a party's failure to 
comply with section 78-36-8fs indorsement 
requirement is a waive able defense. 
[Citation Omitted.] Because Youngblood failed 
to raise the statute of limitations and 
statutory compliance defenses before he 
submitted a response - in this case his trial 
brief - he waived those defenses. 
Id. at 106. 
In this case, defendant failed to raise noncompliance with 
Section 38-1-7(3) as a defense at trial and therefore waived it. 
Section 38-1-7(3) is an "avoidance or affirmative defense" 
to a claim for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18, and not an 
element of the prima facie case. Defendant failed to raise the 
issue of notice either in his pleadings or at trial and has 
waived that defense. 
II. IN THE EVENT NOTICE UNDER SECTION 38-1-7(3) 
IS AN ELEMENT OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
UNDER SECTION 38-1-18, THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON WHETHER NOTICE WAS GIVEN UNDER 
SECTION 38-1-7(3). 
In the event notice under Section 38-1-7(3) is an element of 
a prima facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18, 
then plaintiff's Motion to Reopen for Limited Purposes should be 
granted. The case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing 
on whether the notice requirement under Section 38-1-7(3) was 
satisfied. 
Defendant's argument that plaintiff's pleadings were legally 
insufficient is inaccurate. Attached hereto are the following: 
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1. Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Case for 
Limited Purposes, dated August 21, 1997.2 
2. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen 
Plaintiff's Case for Limited Purpose, dated August 21, 1997.3 
3. Affidavit of Russell A. Cline, dated August 21, 1997.4 
4. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen 
Plaintiff's Case for Limited Purpose, dated September 10, 1997. 
Those pleadings were legally sufficient to present the issue to 
the trial court. Although the "plaintiff" J.V. Hatch 
Construction did not file an affidavit, plaintiff's counsel, 
Russell A. Cline, did file an affidavit. Furthermore, the 
specific grounds for the motion under Rule 59 were fully set 
forth in the reply memorandum. 
Certainly plaintiff was "surprised" when the trial judge 
reversed his earlier decision that compliance with Section 38-1-
7(3) was a defense that must be raised by defendant. "Ordinary 
prudence" could not have guarded against the trial judge later 
reversing his decision. Once the trial court reversed its 
earlier ruling and added a new element, it was an abuse of 
discretion to deny plaintiff's Motion to Reopen for the Limited 
2Also set forth in Addendum to Brief of Appellee Michael 
Kampros, at pp. 58-59. 
3Also set forth in Addendum to Brief of Appellee Michael 
Kampros, at pp. 60-61. 
4Also set forth in Addendum to Brief of Appellee Michael 
Kampros, at pp. 55-57. 
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Purpose of demonstrating the truth of the matter — that the 
mailing requirement was complied with. 
Defendant's claim that he is entitled to attorney's fees 
should he prevail is also inaccurate. A party is only entitled 
to attorney's fees on appeal if he was the successful party 
below. See R & R Energies vs. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 
P.2d 1068 (Utah 1997). Section 38-1-18 does not change the 
general rule. Section 38-1-18 awards attorney's fees to the 
successful party "in any action brought to enforce any lien under 
this chapter." The successful party in the action to "enforce 
the lien" was plaintiff, not defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the lower court and find that a 
prima facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 does 
not include proof of mailing. The Court should remand the case 
for a determination of attorneys fees for both the trial and for 
this appeal. In the alternative, this Court should remand for a 
determination at to whether Section 38-1-7(3) was complied with. 
Dated this ^L^ day of September, 1998. 
Michael W. Crippen' f 
yRussell A. Cline 
^Attorneys for 
J.V. Hatch Construction Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this 3^2-. day of September, 1998, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
Reply Brief were mailed first class postage prepaid to: 
David Overholt 
Richer, Swan & Overholt 
6925 So. Union Park Center 
Suite 450 
Midvale, UT 84047 
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APPENDICES 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Case for 
Limited Purposes, dated August 21, 1997. 
2. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen 
Plaintiff's Case for Limited Purpose, dated August 21, 1997. 
3. Affidavit of Russell A. Cline, dated August 21, 1997. 
4. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen 
Plaintiff's Case for Limited Purpose, dated September 10, 1997. 
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Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C. 
310 South Main Street Suite #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 539-1900 
Telefax (801) 322-1054 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH, 
J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION INC. 
Plaintiff, s 
VS. i 
MICHAEL KAMPROS, ! 
Defendant. 
I MOTION TO REOPEN PLAINTIFF'S 
CASE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE 
CIVIL NO. 950010438 
JUDGE: ROBERT K. HILDER 
Inasmuch as defendant has filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
on the issue of whether the compliance with the mailing requirement 
is an affirmative defense, plaintiff hereby moves to reopen 
plaintiff's case for the limited purpose of introducing the return 
receipt as evidence that the mailing requirement was complied with. 
The grounds therefore are more fully set forth in the accompanying 
memorandum. 
OCM.i.. 
DATED this nx day of August, 1997. 
issell A. Cline 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing pleading was mailed, postage pre-paid to Randy 
Ludlow, 311 South State Street, #280, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, on 
this *H. day of August, 1997. 
000 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C. 
310 South Main Street Suite #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 539-1900 
Telefax (801) 322-1054 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH, 
J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION INC. 
Plaintiff, i 
vs. : 
MICHAEL KAMPROS, 
Defendant. : 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO REOPEN PLAINTIFF'S 
CASE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE 
i CIVIL NO. 950010438 
i JUDGE: ROBERT K. HILDER 
Inasmuch as defendant has filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
of whether compliance with the mailing requirement is an 
affirmative defense, plaintiff should be allowed to reopen its case 
for the limited purpose of demonstrating that in fact the mailing 
requirement was complied with. Defendant's maneuvering is a matter 
of form over substance. Defendant knows that the mailing 
requirement was complied with. Rather than allowing defendant to 
00(M 
raise by innuendo the implication that mailing did not occur, 
Plaintiff should have the opportunity o£ introducing evidence that 
it did. 
DATED this *2J day of August, 1997. 
Russell A. Cline 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing pleading was mailed, postage pre-paid to Randy 
Ludlow, 311 South State Street, #280, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, on 
this ^ day of August, 1997. 
ixt/t 
00f< 6 / 
Russell A. Cllne (4298) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C. 
310 South Main Street Suite #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 539-1900 
Telefax (801) 322-1054 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION INC. 
Plaintiff, : 
VS. ! 
MICHAEL KAMPROS, 
Defendant. : 
AFFIDAVIT OF RUSSELL CLINE 
: CIVIL NO. 950010438 
: JUDGE: ROBERT K. HILDER 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Russell A. Cline, being duly sworn, does say and depose as 
follows: 
1. Within a day or two after the Notice of Lien was filed on 
August 31, 1995, I caused a copy thereof to be mailed to Michael 
Kampros by certified mail. 
2. Attached hereto is a copy of the green card that was 
000.55 
returned* It shows that the date of delivery was September 2, 1995 
and the date of return was September 5, 1995. 
3. I understood Michael Kampros to be the 'reputed owner" 
after his mother's death as personal representative of his mother's 
estate. As it turns out, he was the actual owner* 
Dated this 'TA day of August, 1997. 
sell A. Cline 
Sworn and subscribed before me this ^ 1/^ Day of August, 1997. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JANICE ANN 8. QARNER 
880 North 325 W«t 
Bountiful, ITT 84010 
MyComnteJonBqptrw 
June 7.2001 
STATE OP UTAH 
Notary Public 
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Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C. 
310 South Main Street Suite #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 539-1900 
Telefax (801) 322-1054 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL KAMPROS, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REOPEN 
CASE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE 
CIVIL NO. 950010438 
JUDGE: ROBERT K. HILDER 
Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
there are ample grounds to reopen this case for the limited purpose 
of demonstrating that the mailing requirement was complied with. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the 
Court may "take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions" for a 
number of reasons, including 1) "[a]ccident or surprise, which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against/ and 2) 
"[iInsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision:" 
The court may open the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
• • • 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against. 
• • • 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against law. 
In this case, plaintiff has treated this issue as an 
affirmative defense and if this Court reconsiders and reverses its 
prior ruling, there is sufficient "accident or surprise" to justify 
plaintiff's introduction of evidence demonstrating complieuice with 
the mailing requirement. Similarly, to the extent that this court 
reconsiders and reverses its prior ruling, there is insufficiency 
of the evidence" as to whether the mailing requirement was actually 
complied with. 
In a similar case, In Re Logan Riverf 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 
1989), the Court reopened the case to admit into evidence exhibits 
that were attached to post-trial memorandum. The Court stated as 
follows: 
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In an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry 
of a new judgment. The basis for a motion 
made for the purpose of so amending a judgment 
are delineated in the rule, those pertinent to 
this proceeding being accident, surprise, 
newly discovered evidence, or insufficiency of 
the evidence to justify the decision... [I]t 
lies within the sound discretion of the court 
to reopen the case. 
Id^ . at 1245. 
Similarly, in this case, plaintiff has attached a copy of the 
return receipt demonstrating compliance with the mailing 
requirements as an exhibit to a post-trial memorandum for 
consideration by the Court. This should be introduced into 
evidence. 
Defendant's assertion that "a case may not be reopened for 
presentation of evidence which was in a parties control at the time 
of trial" is absolutely false. The case cited by defendant, Powers 
v. Gene's Building Materialsf 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977), involves a 
motion for a new jury trial, not a motion to reopen a bench trial 
to take limited additional testimony. In Powersf after a jury 
rendered a verdict against defendants, defendants moved for a new 
jury trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The Court 
denied that motion on the grounds that the "new evidence" was 
"subject to discovery and could have been obtained by the exercise 
3 
of ordinary diligence." 
This case does not involve a motion for a new jury trial, but 
a motion to open a bench trial for the limited purpose of 
demonstrating that the mailing requirement was complied with. As 
stated in Logan Riverf "In an action tried without a jury, the 
Court may open the judgment if one has been entered, to take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law 
or make new findings and conclusions... and it lies within the 
sound discretion of the court to reopen the case." 
Mr. Kampros seeks reconsideration of a ruling based on the 
assertion that the mailing rule was not complied with, but asks the 
Court to deny a motion to introduce evidence to demonstrate the 
truth of the matter. Mr. Kampros cannot have it both ways. If 
this Court reconsiders the issue of whether the compliance with the 
mailing requirement is an affirmative defense, then the Court 
should also allow evidence demonstrating that the mailing 
requirement was complied with. 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's Motion to Reopen for 
Limited Purpose should be granted. 
DATED this iO day of September, 1997. 
Russell A. Cline 
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The foregoing pleading was mailed, postage pre-paid to Randy 
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